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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
1'i"!JFH'lE:3:3 BUILDING SYSTEMS, 
F., and KERRY R. HUBBLE, 
CASE NO. 19009 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
v5. 
'HARLES H. CHAP'\AN and EDYTHE 
S. CHAPMAN, 
Defendants-Respondents. 
BRIEF OF DEFENDANTS-RESPONDENTS 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
The Appeal in this matter is from a Directed 
Verdict granted against plaintiffs and in favor of 
1efendants. The Directed Verdict is premised on the Court's 
determination, that whether the plaintiffs were a general 
contractor, i.e. a licensed contractor or not, was a matter 
of law. Further, the Court determined that they were not 
entitled to recover. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendants-Respondents respectfully request that 
j11dgment of the Trial Court be affirmed. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
The Plaintiffs-Appellants, hereinafter refer.;· 
to as "Plaintiffs", in their Statement of Facts, set fort':. 
in part, the applicable and pertinent facts. "1any of tre 
statements in that section of plaintiffs' Brief on Appea. 
are not supported by the record and are merely gratuitous. 
Accordingly, it is necessary to state the appropriate an1 
relevent facts with references to the available record anJ 
address statements of fact asserted by the plaintiff that 
are outside the record. 
The Respondent-Defendant, hereinafter referreo 
to as "Defendant", Charles H. Chapman, is a retired Air 
Force enlisted man, without any building construction 
experience. The other Respondent-Defendant, hereinafter 
referred to as "Defendant", Edythe s. Chapman, is a 
housewife and nurse, who has no other connection with this 
matter other than a co-owner of the property upon which 
the cabin was constructed. 
The plaintiff, Wilderness Building Systems, Inc. 
registered corporation, nor is it a registerd 
"d/b/a", let alone authorized to do business in the State 
of Utah; nor is it a licensed contractor, licensP1' 
construct cabins or any structures in the State of Ucjl·. 
(R-051) of the Court documents). Its co-plaintiff wh·J 
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0 pr_,- r,unself i'lS the President of that nonexistent 
,,-, Kerr} R. Hubble, and was not, at the time of 
-,,, •_,.,,;t, construction, nor trial, a licensed contractor 
Jur, or any other state (R-052). 
The defendant, Charles H. Chapman, purchased 
,,,;trigr.t from plaintiff, Wilderness Building Systems, Inc., 
, log kit which consisted of the logs to construct the 
J'Jtside shell of a log cabin in May of 1981 (See Exhibit 
3 -P) • This purchase is not contested and was not the 
subject matter of this lawsuit. 
Later, the defendant, Charles H. Chapman, 
negotiated with plaintiff and reached a signed agreement 
to purchase the additional materials needed to erect the 
:abin in Summit County (See Trial Exhibit 4-P) At the 
same time, the parties orally agreed to have plaintiff 
the cabin utilizing the previously purchased log 
and the additional log home framing package as shown 
Exhibit 4-P for the sum of $2,500.00. When the oral 
a3reement was reduced to writing, the erection cost was 
unilaterally changed by plaintiffs to $3,850.00, which was 
$1,350.00 more than the original price of $2,500.00 (See 
Exhibits 5-P and 17-P) The change in price is what 
the Respondent, Charles H. Chapman from signing 
Other than the change in price, the document 
1°Llects the intent of the parties that plaintiff, 
.lil1erness Building Systems, Inc., as contractor, build 
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the cabin. 
The Respondent, Charles H. Chapman, 'lS 'l tcil'' 
inexperienced individual in construction, hired aco:3u"'-
licensed contractor, Appellant, Wilderness Building 
Inc. and Kerry R. Hubble, to act as the general contractor, 
to properly construct his cabin as shown by the building 
permit (See Exhibit 28-D). 
The cabin was to be constructed, based upon 
architectural drawings and sketches provided by plaintiffs 
(See Exhibits 9-P, 10-P, 11-P, and 12-P) During the 
progress of construction, it became apparent to Respondent, 
Charles H. Chapman, that the specified and purchase1 
materials were not being used, and that the construction 
itself was not consistent with the architectural drawings, 
nor the sketches furnished by plaintiffs (See Exhibit 17-P). 
At that time, defendant, Charles H. Chapman, 
requested that plaintiffs cease and disist any further 
construction on the cabin (See Exhibit 18-P). Further, 
defendant, Charles H. Chapman, contacted the State of Utah, 
Department of Business Regulations, Division of Contnctors, 
to lodge a Complaint against plaintiffs, Wilderness Building 
Systems, Inc. and/or Kerry R. Hubble. It was at this time, 
that defendants learned for the first time that neit:1e' 
of the plaintiffs were licensed contractors. De 
Charles H. Chapman, then proceeded to file a Complo1n' 
against the pl3intiffs at the above-referenced DivisiM 
, f ,- ri n t r 1 t o r s ( See Ex h i b i t 1 7 - P ) • 
it had become evident that the Division 
·tors powerless to act against plaintiffs since 
,., ,,,,, unlicensed and therefore had no license upon which 
c. ne Division of Contractors could act upon, defendants 
pr2pared, through an attorney, a Complaint. However, before 
't could be served upon the plaintiffs, a Complaint filed 
bl plaintiffs was served upon the defendants. Said 
complaint being filed on February 24, 1982 (See R-001, 002, 
003 and 004). An Answer and Counterclaim was filed by 
defendants on March 17, 1982 (R-001, 012, 013, 014, 015 
and 016) Contrary to the statement made by plaintiffs 
in their Brief, defendants Answer and Counterclaim is not 
?remised solely on the fact that plaintiffs were unlicensed, 
but primarily because of improper construction (R-11, 012, 
013, 014, 015, and 106). After the completion of discovery, 
defendants filed a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment 
premised on statute. Said statutes were Utah Code 
Sec. 58-1-26, 58A-l-l or their predecessor, 
58-23-26 and 58-23-1. 
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, SEC. 58A-l-26, ACTION 
FOR COMPENSATION AS CONTRACTOR PROHIBITED 
WITHOUT A LICENSE. 
contractor may act as agent or commence or 
any action in any court of the state for collection 
or 
Ji compensation for the performance of act!\ acts for which 
-5-
a license is required by this without 
proving that he was a duly licensed contractor .Yhen 
contract sued upon was entered into and •,yhen the a11,"1a" 
cause of action arose. 
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, SEC. 58A-l-l LICENSE 
REQUIRED FOR CONTRACTING - PRIMA FACIE 
EVIDENCE OF CONTRACTING. 
It shall be unlawful for any person, firm, co-
partnership, corporation, association, or other 
organization, or any combination of any thereof, 
to engage in the business or act in the capacity 
of contractor within this state without having 
a license therefor as provided in this code, un-
less the person, firm, copartnership, corporation, 
association or other organization is specifically 
exempted. Evidence of the securing of any con-
struction or building permit from a governmental 
agency, or the employment of any person on a 
construction project, or the offering of any 
bid to do the work of a contractor as herein 
defined, shall be accepted in any court of the 
State of Utah as prima facie evidence of engaging 
in the business or acting in the capacity of a 
contractor. 
The Motion for Partial Summary Judgment '.Yas heHj 
on November 15, 1982 before the Honorable Homer F. 
Wilkinson, District Court Judge, found that questions oi 
fact were raised, and denied the Motion (See R-058). 
Trial proceeded on November 18, 1982 before' 
jury, presided over by the Honorable Homer F. Wilkinso:i. 
At the close of plaintiffs' case, after the Court c,j1 
received testimony from plaintiffs' witnesses that ch·e, 
were unlicensed at the time of the contract, construction, 
and even were still unlicensed during the trial to 
-6-
structures, testimony was elicited that 
,, 1 i J l 1 ua ls employed on the cabin, which is the subject 
this case, were employed by plaintiffs' and were 
p 3 1d by plaintiffs. Defendants made a Motion for Directed 
Verdict, again based upon the aforementioned statutes. 
At that time, the Court took defendants' Motion 
,1nder 3dvisement and defendants proceeded with their portion 
of the trial, rebutting plaintiffs allegations and laying 
the foundation for their Counterclaim. The Motion for 
Directed Verdict was again renewed at the close of 
defendants case, but was still taken under advisement, and 
the matter was then given to the jury. The jury came back 
in favor of plaintiffs and against defendants in the sum 
·)f $7,250.00. At this time, defendants made a Motion for 
Directed Verdict and/or Motion Not Withstanding Verdict, 
but was advised by the Court that this matter would be ruled 
upon at a later date (See R-58-A-8-C). 
On the 20th day of December, 1982, further 
was heard on defendants Motion, and a Motion for 
Jirected Verdict was granted, and it is from this Motion 
for Directed Verdict that plaintiffs appeal. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THERE IS NO COMPETENT EVIDENCE THAT EITHER 
PLAINTIFF WAS A LICENSED CONTRACTOR 
AUTHORIZED TO CONSTRUCT CABINS OR OTHER 
STRUCTURES IN THE STATE OF UTAH, SO AS TO 
JUSTIFY VACATING THE ORDER GRANTING DIRECTED 
VERDICT. 
The Certificate of Custodian of Records on ftlo 
herein, and dated November 15, 1982, state unequivocali, 
that neither plaintiff was a licensed contractor ever ic' 
the State of Utah, either previously or at that time. 
Certificates are a total impeachment of plaintiff, Kerrc 
R. Hubble's statement in his deposition taken three Ill 
months previously on the 4th day of August, 1982 (Pg. 14, 
Line 17 et seq.). 
Further, the testimony of plaintiffs at tr.e 
of trial, was unable to rebut the aforementioned Certi f i-3i: 0 
of Custodian of Records, and even further admitted tU' 
they were not licensed in any other state. Theref•He, 
is an unimpeachabie fact that neither of the ploin'i, 
- tl-
'"•1 contractors in the State of Utah or anywhere 
'he time of contracting, construction or trial. 
t ·ir the 1 icense are set forth in 
, , , ,,,,, ·>-nP. vs. "icGlynn/Garmaker Co., 567 P2d 1110 
11"', ..ir,ere tr.e Utah Supreme Court stated: 
"This Court has held that the contracts of un-
licensed contractors are void. In the case of 
Olsen vs. Reese, we held: 
The authorities are fairly uniform to the 
effect that failure to obtain a license which 
is required by a statute enacted solely for 
revenue purposes does not render contracts made 
by the offending party void. On the other hand, 
contracts made by an unlicensed contractor when 
in violation of a statute passed for the protect-
ion of the public are held to be void and enforce-
able. Our statute is so worded as to indicate 
a legislative intent to protect the citizens from 
irresponsible contractors. The statute, while 
not comprehensive provides for a small license 
fee. Control over the contractor is given to 
the Department of Registration. Upon an ap-
propriate hearing, the Department may, for un-
professional conduct, suspend or cancel the 
license. Good reputation and integrity are 
essential to obtaining a license and the en-
tire object of the statute is protection of 
the public against fradulent and illegal 
practice, which have always been recognized 
as a distinct characteristic of statutes, which 
are not mere revenue measures. The statute 
being enacted for the protection of the public, 
Plaintiff's written contract is void ••• " 
In the Meridian case, an out-of-state contractor 
•to held a license in another state and not Utah, was denied 
ch2 ri1ht to recover under construction contracts. The 
''rl not allow a substitution of license from another 
·1 t 0 u t -3 h • Neither of plaintiffs held a license 
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anywhere. Therefore, plaintiffs have no basis t:> requo' 
vacation of the Order granting Directed Verdict. 
POINT II 
THERE IS NO COMPETENT EVIDENCE THAT PLAINTIFFS 
DID NOT ACT AS THE CONTRACTOR ON THE CABIN. 
The evidence that is before this Court is that 
plaintiffs contracted to erect the cabin (See Exhibit 5-PJ. 
The evidence additionally shows that plaintiff, Kerry R, 
Hubble, was listed as the contractor on the building permit 
(See Exhibit 28-D). There is no question that plaintiffs 
contracted the erection of said cabin for a pre-determined 
amount albeit $2,500.00 as defendants contend or $3,850.00 
as the agreement only signed by plaintiffs states (See 
Exhibit 5-P). Plaintiffs did not contract to build the 
cabin for wages. Plaintiffs hired employees to perform 
the construction on the cabin, and as employers, paid wages 
to the employees. The defendants did not pay wages and 
were therefore not owner-contractors. 
The applicable statute, 58-A-1-1, and its 
predecessor, 58-23-1, Utah Code Annotated, (19531, 
establishes prima facie evidence of contracting. It states 
that if the plaintiffs employed any parson on t',e 
construction project (the cabin) which they have testifi2' 
to, both in deposition (Kerry R. Hubble deposition, Pq. Jl 
- 1 0 -
-
1 ·n•? 0 t. seq.), and at trial, or the offering of any 
1., c.he •.vark, which is e)(actly what plaintiffs did 
"1 0 13 Harne Framing Package Erection Agreement" (See 
•.. zi,[1,it 5-p), then plaintiffs are prima facie established 
•S under the contract. The Trial Court Judge 
3110.ved plaintiffs to put on their case to rebut the prima 
f3cie evidence that they were acting as contractors and 
0 s such, were required to be licensed, particularly if they 
wished to maintain an action for recovery of work 
performed. Even at Trial, plaintiff, Kerry R. Hubble, 
admitted that he had plead guilty to a misdemeanor charge 
of contracting without a license on this e)(act project, 
the Chapman cabin, filed by the Summit County Attorney. 
In the discretion of the Trial Court Judge, 
failed in their case to establish sufficient 
to rebutt the presumption that they have acted 
as a licensed general contractor, when in fact, they were 
not. Plaintiffs were required to be licensed, and they 
POINT II I 
THERE HAS BEEN NO COMPETENT EVIDENCE PRESENTED 
TO THIS COURT TO PROVIDE ANY BASIS FOR THIS COURT 
TO FIND ANY EXCEPTION TO PREVENT ENFORCEMENT OF 
UTAH STATE STATUTE, PREVENTING RECOVERY FOR WORK 
DONE BY UNLICENSED CONTRACTORS. 
The Legislature, at the time of the enactment 
of this law, felt that the public, ,_,, 1,, 101 , 
w i thou t s u f f i c i en t cons t r u ct i ,, n kn o ·w l e d g , s , 
protected from incompetent and unqu;i l if i ed c011 t, 1 
The method chosen for enforcement, was that of ce,-,'-"'l 
licensing qualified individuals and companies '1nd 11 
allowing those individuals and companies who are unlicenseo, 
to collect for their work performed, regardless of itc 
quality. There is no question that defendants ·were wi thoiF_ 
any knowledge in the field of construction, and 
were the exact type of individuals to which this law ·11as 
enacted to protect (See Chapman deposition, Pg. 71, Lin,o 
2 through 4). The testimony elicited both at :he 
depositions and at the trial, unequivocally show that the 
cabin structure was not built according to the blueprints, 
the sketches provided (See Exhibits 9-P, 10-P, 11-f', and 
12-P) by plaintiffs themselves, nor utilyzing materials 
they sold defendant, Charles H. Chapman, as listed in the 
Log Home Framing Package Agreement (See Exhibit 
Further, testimony at trial by one of the Summit Count\ 
Building Inspectors, showed that said structure had ne·;er 
been passed as a finished structure to allow occupanc\. 
Therefore, it is apparent that what occur red on the Chapmcin 
cabin, i.e. shoddy and improper construction, was exa:tl·, 
what the Legislature intended to hopefully Prevent :i·1 
enactment of the aforementioned statutes. 
There has been one area of inroad in this do-:'_r 1 " 
- 1 -
lb")·;e. There aopears to be a three pronged test 
in order for an unlicensed contractor 
1. This test is set forth in Lignell vs. Berg, 
J1i11. T'1e test is as follows: 
l. Has the license inadvertently lapsed 
and or was there a good faith effort made to 
satisfy the licensing requirements. 
2. The contracting parties knew or had 
knowledge of the contractor's abilities and 
thus did not rely on the competence of the con-
tractor. 
3. The contractor supplied a performance 
bond. 
This test is shown in the Lignell case wherein 
er.is Court stated as follows: 
This Court has had frequent occasion to 
comment on the status of unlicensed 
contractors, and has persistently construed 
the cited statute as having been designed 
to protect the public and consistently to 
bar recovery by unlicensed contractors for 
services rendered under their contracts. 
The most recent Utah cases so holding are 
Mosely vs. Johnson, 22 Utah 2d 348, 453 
P2d 149 and Meridian Corp. vs. McGlynn/ 
Garmaker Company, Utah 567 P2d 1110. The 
rationale of those cases is, however, that 
the party from whom the contractor seeks 
to recover is in the class the legislature 
intended to protect. A litigant is not a 
member of that class if the required protect-
ion (i.e., against inept and financially 
irresponsible builders) is in fact afforded 
by other means. 
In Fillmore Products vs. Western States 
Paving, 561 P2d 687, we adopted the point 
of view expressed by Professor Corbin, viz., 
"the general rule" (of nonenforceability) 
is not to be applied mechanically but in 
a manner "permitting the court to consider 
the merits of the pcirticulor cise ""J r 
avoid unreasonable penal t: i es and f·1f 1 J,' 
ures." 
In this case, the denial of recover\ •, 
BBC would indeed impose, unreasonable 
penalties and forfeitures, particular1 1 
because the Owners were never deprived of 
the kind of protection the licensing statute 
was designed to afford. We consider the 
following circumstances to be of cont roll in1 
significance in this regard: 
1. BBC has not failed to satisfy the 
licensing authority of its technical compe-
tence and financial qualification for 
license. It had inadvertently permitted 
its license to lapse. Restoration of licence 
status involved no new demonstration of 
qualification, but only payment of fee. 
2. The Owners did not rely on any 
BBC competence they inferred from BBC's 
having advertised itself as a general 
contractor. They had previously employed 
BBC as a builder in apartment house con-
struction. Moreover, the Owners usurped 
the general contractor's prerogatives in 
constructing the Terace Incline complex. 
They relied on their own competence. 
3. BBC supported a performance bond 
as well as labor and material suppliers 
payment bond. The Owners were infinetel\ 
better assured of adequate and complete 
performance without financial exposure 
beyond the contract price than they would 
have been by BBC's mere compliance with 
the licensing statute. 
Plaintiffs do not satisfy any of the tr,ree pnn3c 
of the test. They never had a license, the defendants jiJ 
not have knowledge of the contractor's ability, and r 0 1i"·1 
on their competence, and neither plaintiff provided 
formance bond. 
-0nl1 0ther possible inroad against the 
c·C:Jed St"JtUteS is, if the Unlicensed Contractors 
contractor supervise the total construction 
,_or l·J! .ne'l by plaintiffs. This was not the situation in 
'.1'CP ."Jt 8ar. In Motivated Management International 
•10 • f'irn<"y, 604 P.2d 467, Utah, 1979, the court was ruling 
Jn a '1oti0n to Dismiss a Complaint for failure to state 
3 claim, when a Motion to Amend the Compalint was before 
tr.e Court and had not been ruled upon. In that case the 
oiaintiff r,ad not had a chance to present the evidence to 
1emonstrate that he was entitled to an exception to the 
ooplicable statutes. Plaintiff apparently was not even 
,ii0•>1ed to amend its Complaint, although defense counsel, 
ot the hearing, requested that the court should consider 
'Le '1otion on the basis of the Amended Complaint. In the 
ore:::ent case, the court wisely did not rule on Defendants' 
·-1°ti0n for Partial Summary Judgment. The court determined 
Plaintiffs should be allowed to present their case 
"o determine if they were entitled to be an exception to 
tne The Plaintiffs presented their case and the 
' 0 'Jrt, in its discretion, determined the facts were not 
''Jrfi:ient; that is, met the three prong test of Lignell 
t, a 1 tr. e con s t r u c t i on be e n sup e r v i s e d by a 1 i c ens e d 
1 ,.. r 1•:: t1J r • 
n,e on l} similar fact contrary to what Plaintiffs 
both cases involved a "package home" type 
- 1 ") -
structure, and that is where the 'JI' I 
Therefore, Plaintiffs are not 'lll0wed t,) c,)me under eL' 
of these exceptions. 
CONCLUSION 
The defendants respectfully S[.;bmit that n, 2 
plaintiffs did not provide the Trial Court with a 111 
reasonably competent evidence upon which the Trial Courl 
would be or would have been justified in denying Defendants' 
Motion for a Directed Verdict. The statutes are clear and 
unequivocal. The statute specifically prevents recoveq 
by Plaintiffs and Plaintiffs failed to prove to the Trial 
Court that they were entitled to be an exception to 
statute. 
It is well within the Trial Court's discretion 
to grant defendants' Motion for Directed Verdict, and tr.a'" 
there is no evidence that the Trial Court abused it' 
discretion in granting defendants' Motion for DirecteJ 
Verdict. Therefore, the decision of the Trial Court 
granting defendants' Motion should stand. 
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ilEoPECTFULL'! SUBMITTED this _L day of August, 
ANDERSON & 
Defendants-
CERTIFICATE OF HAND DELIVERY 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the day of August, 
9 8 3 ' hand delivered a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing Brief of Defendants-Respondents, to JOHN WALSH, 
'ttorney for Plaintiffs-Appellants, Suite 202 Cove Point 
Plaza, 3865 South Wasatch Boulevard, Salt Lake City, Utah 
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